We present a model of political budget cycles in which incumbents influence voters by targeting government spending to specific groups of voters at the expense of other voters or other expenditures. Each voter faces a signal extraction problem: being targeted with expenditure before the election may reflect opportunistic manipulation, but may also reflect a sincere preference of the incumbent for the types of spending that voter prefers. We show the existence of a political equilibrium in which rational voters support an incumbent who targets them with spending before the election even though they know it may be electorally motivated. In equilibrium voters in the more "swing" regions are targeted at the expense of types of spending not favored by these voters.
Introduction
Conventional wisdom is that incumbents use economic policy -especially fiscal policy -before elections to influence electoral outcomes. A number of studies (Shi and Svensson [2006] , Persson and Tabellini [2003] ) find evidence of an electoral deficit or expenditure cycle in a broad cross-section of countries, an empirical finding that Brender and Drazen (2005a) argue reflects electoral cycles in a subset of these countries, namely those that recently democratized. These "new democracies" are characterized by increases in government deficits in election years in the first few elections after the transition to democracy. In contrast, in "established" democracies, they find no statistically significant political cycle across countries in aggregate central government expenditure or deficits, a finding which is robust to various specifications.
The finding of no political deficit cycle in established democracies raises an obvious question:
Is fiscal manipulation absent or, more likely, does it simply appear in different forms? That is, in established democracies, do politicians use election-year fiscal policy to influence voters in such a way that the overall government budget deficit is not significantly affected? This could occur, for example, if some groups of voters are targeted at the expense of others. Groups whose voting behavior is seen as especially susceptible to targeted fiscal policy may be targeted with higher expenditures and transfers, or by tax cuts, financed by expenditure cuts or tax increases on other groups whose votes are much less sensitive to such policy. Such election-year "pork barrel spending", by which we mean policies or legislation targeted to specific groups of voters to gain their political support, is widely seen as an especially important component of electoral manipulation. Policies of this type include geographically concentrated investment projects (a common, more narrow definition of "pork barrel spending"), expenditures and transfers targeted to specific demographic groups, or tax cuts benefitting certain sectors. 1 In this paper, we develop a model of electoral manipulation via targeting specific groups of voters with government spending, where there is no effect on total spending or the deficit.
Several papers find evidence of significant changes in the composition of government spending in election years. Khemani (2004) finds that Indian states spend more on public investment before scheduled elections that in other times, while they contract current spending, leaving the overall balance unchanged. Kneebone and McKenzie (2001) look for evidence of a political budget cycle for Canadian provinces, and find no evidence of a cycle in aggregate spending, but do find electoral increases in what they call "visible expenditures", mostly investment expenses such as construction of roads and structures. Very similar findings are reported for Mexico by Gonzales (2002) , who also finds that other categories of spending, such as current transfers, contract prior to elections. Drazen and Eslava (2005) present empirical evidence on compositional effects in regional political budget cycles in Colombia, where investment projects grow before elections, while current spending contracts.
Interestingly, electoral composition effects seem to imply expansions in development projects, which are in general easily targeted. Khemani (2004) , for instance, argues that his finding of greater public investment before elections suggests that election-year policy takes the form of targeting of special interests, rather than an attempt to sway the mass of voters at large.
The evidence of electoral effects on the composition of spending, rather than on the overall deficit, is consistent with findings on how voters react to election-year government deficits, both in individual country and in cross-section studies. Brender (2003) finds that voters in Israel penalize election year deficits, but also that they reward high expenditure in development projects in the year that precedes an election. Similarly, Peltzman's (1992) result that U.S. voters punish government spending holds for current (as opposed to capital) expenditures, but is weaker if investment in roads, an important component of public investment, is included in his policy variable. Drazen and Eslava (2005) find that voters in Colombia reward high pre-election public investment, but only to the extent that this extra spending is not obtained at the expense of larger deficits. Alesina, Perotti, and Tavares (1998) look at election outcomes and opinion polls for 19 OECD countries and find that after sharp fiscal adjustments based mostly on current spending cuts, the probability that an incumbent remains in power does not fall. Perhaps the strongest evidence suggesting that deficits do not help reelection prospects comes from Brender and Drazen (2005b) in a sample of 74 countries over the period 1960 -2003 find no evidence that deficits help reelection in any group of countries, including developed and less developed, new and old democracies, countries with different government or electoral systems, and countries with different levels of democracy. In developed countries and established democracies, they find that election-year deficits actually significantly reduce the probability that a leader is reelected.
In short, the strategy of using targeted increases in spending before elections financed by cuts on some other types of spending rather than by increased deficits seems to be optimal for an incumbent seeking re-election.
In spite of the widespread use of policies targeted at specific groups of voters or types of expenditures before elections, there are no rational-voter models of the political cycle integrating targeted expenditures that are truly intertemporal. Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Dixit and Londregan (1996) present formal models where, in order to gain votes, candidates make promises of spending to some voter groups (based on their characteristics) financed by cuts in spending on other groups so as to keep the government budget balanced. However, they assume that campaign promises are binding commitments to a post-electoral fiscal policy. Hence, in these models the problem of who gets targeted is essentially a static one, with no voter inference problem about post-electoral utility based on the pre-electoral economic magnitudes announced by candidates. 2 Hence, these models do not really answer a key question: Why would rational, forward-looking voters who are targeted by the incumbent before the election find it optimal to vote for him? The answer is far from obvious:
if Floridians know that politicians target them solely because of a forthcoming election, why would they believe that such spending will continue after the incumbent is reelected? This paper squarely addresses this question, incorporating expenditure targeting in a framework of repeated elections with rational voters. 3 The best known approach in modeling why rational, forward-looking voters might respond to election-year economics was introduced by Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) , based on the unobservability of an incumbent's ability or "competence" in providing aggregate expenditures without raising taxes. 4 More "competent" candidates can provide more public goods at a given level of taxes, and hence generate higher welfare, so they are preferred by voters. Since competence is correlated over time, a candidate who is inferred by voters to be more competent than average before the election is expected to be so after the election as well. 5 Voters rationally prefer a candidate from whom they observe higher expenditures before an election, since this is a signal of higher competence, implying higher overall expenditure after the election.
A key ingredient of various models focussing on competence is voters' inability to observe the overall level of spending or of the deficit (Rogoff [1990] , Shi and Svensson [2006] ). Because of this assumption, the competence approach often implies an increase in total government expenditures (or 2 Most other papers that consider the allocation of "pork" across different groups of voters (Myerson (1993) , Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (2000) , Lizzeri and Persico (2001) ) similarly assume that candidates make binding promises to voters. Grossman and Helpman (2005) do not assume binding promises. However, as in the other papers, pre-electoral distribution of pork per se plays no role in determining election outcomes. Furthermore, in their paper there is no voter uncertainty about policymakers preferences over the allocation of pork, which is central to our approach.
3 Strömberg (2005) presents an interesting model of the campaign visits by presidential candidates to different U.S. states (a type of targeting), but where voter response to targeting is assumed rather than derived from primitives. 4 Other rational voter models include Tabellini (1990), González (2001) , Stein and Streb (2004) , and Shi and Svensson (2006) . All of these models share with the Rogoff approach a reliance on the effect of pre-electoral fiscal expansion on expected aggregate activity or welfare after the election. 5 A key innovation of Shi and Svensson (2006) is that the policymaker chooses fiscal policy before he knows his competence level, so that all "types" choose the same level of expansion. That is, the model focusses on moral hazard rather than signaling, as do the other models. An implication is an aggregate deficit cycle.
in the government budget deficit) in an election year. This relation between voters' lack of information and aggregate fiscal expansion is consistent with Brender and Drazen's (2005a) empirical finding of no statistically significant aggregate deficit or expenditure cycle in established democracies, where voters may be well informed about fiscal outcomes.
The absence of political budget cycles in democracies where voters are experienced and presumably informed about fiscal policy (and the further finding of Brender and Drazen [2005b] that higher election-year expenditures or deficits do not increase an incumbent's probability of reelection in these democracies), suggests that rational voters may be trying to infer something other than (or in addition to) competence from election-year fiscal policy. That is, these empirical findings suggest that imperfect information about competence alone is not a sufficient basis for an asymmetric information explanation of voter response to election-year policies. On the other hand, since expenditure targeted at some groups of voters is a common form of election-year policy, voters may use pre-election economic policy to learn not primarily the likely level of post-electoral expenditure (if the incumbent is re-elected) as in the competence approach, but the composition of expenditure across groups of voters. Put simply, voters targeted before an election want to know whether they will be similarly favored after the election if the incumbent is re-elected.
If voters are indeed using pre-election spending to make inferences about the composition of government spending after the election, one wonders: What makes it credible that a politician will continue to favor the same groups after the election that he targeted before? Our argument is that politicians have unobserved preferences over groups of voters or types of expenditure, preferences that have some persistence over time. This persistence implies that a voter who believes that the incumbent favors him before the election rationally expects some similarity in the composition of expenditures after the election as well. 6 This change from the competence approach in the unobserved characteristic of incumbents significantly changes the nature of the inference problem that voters face. In models in the Rogoff tradition, a voter must infer whether high pre-electoral expenditure on an observable component of the budget reflects higher incumbent ability to provide goods in general, or whether it is "purchased" at the expense of a cut in some other good (or a tax increase) observed only after the election. In our model, instead, a voter knows how a change in spending was financed and what was the total spending, but tries to learn to what extent the pre-election composition of spending will be replicated 6 Another argument is that politicians who renege on the (implicit) commitment to continue a government program after the election may lose the ability to use fiscal policy as a tool to influence voters in future elections. This may make the pre-election composition of expenditure a credible signal of the composition the incumbent would choose if re-elected.
after the election and, based on that inference, whether he will be better off under the incumbent or the challenger. As a result, electoral fiscal policy may be present even if voters can perfectly observe all of the elements of fiscal policy. This is one key difference between our model and those in the competence tradition.
In our approach, moreover, a voter may have imperfect information both about the politicians's preferences over different voter groups and about voting patterns over the population. If both types of asymmetric information are present, each voter must try to infer whether receiving high targeted expenditures before the election signals a high weight of his group in the incumbent's objective function (relative to other voters or to non-targeted expenditures) or simply how "swing" his demographic group is, meaning how many votes the incumbent can raise by targeting his group with expenditures.
Put more simply, a politicians tries to convince a voter that he truly "likes" him (or has the same objectives), while voters wonder whether the expressions of love and caring will disappear once the votes are counted.
Our emphasis on cycles in the composition of spending, rather than its overall level, is consistent with the evidence cited above that voters are "fiscal conservatives" who punish (rather than reward) high spending or deficits at the polls. Our model in fact suggests that, if voters are averse to deficits, observability of fiscal policy strengthens the incentive to finance electoral spending through the contraction of other expenditures. The greater ability of voters to monitor fiscal outcomes in established democracies may help explain the absence of significant political deficit cycles.
Another key difference with the competence literature is that political budget cycles in our model arise even if all politicians are equally able to provide public goods. We assume here that all politicians are equally competent in delivering pork in order to obtain a clear contrast with that literature, rather than because we think competence is unimportant. We are aware that in a system with geographically defined districts, legislators often campaign for reelection on the basis of their ability to obtain projects for their district. However, if competence in getting pork is general and not specific to a demographic group (as, for example, Dixit and Londregan [1996] ) or type of expenditure (as in Strömberg [2001] ), demonstrating competence in delivering pork may be necessary to be reelected, but it would not be sufficient. Suppose a specific group of voters believed that a politician was very competent in delivering pork, but also believed that he did not care about them at times other than elections.
These voters would then expect that after the election he will use his pork-raising competence to benefit other groups, so they would have no reason to vote for him on the basis of high perceived competence. 7 Hence, preferences over groups of voters seem crucial in explaining pork-barrel politics.
In reality, both politician competence and politician preferences are no doubt important in explaining the importance of pork in elections, but here we focus on the role of the latter, which has not been much explored.
In a model with asymmetric information about the preferences of politicians, and possibly also with asymmetric information about how "swing" different groups in society are, we demonstrate that there exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which voters rationally respond to election-year expenditures and politicians allocate expenditure across groups on the basis of this behavior. Politicians increase spending targeted to electorally attractive groups before elections, while they contract other types of expenditure to satisfy the no-deficit constraint. As mentioned, a key result is that electoral manipulation arises even with fully rational voters. We further show that the responsiveness of voters to fiscal manipulation depends on the amount of information they have about how "swing" different groups are; however, a political cycle arises even when voters know how "swing" each group is.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section we present an overview of our approach.
In section 3 we present a model of politicians with unobserved preferences over groups of voters.
In section 4 we show the existence of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium for this model with rational, forward-looking voters in which there is a political cycle in the composition of expenditure. In section 5 we add a good valued only by politicians ("office rents") to show that electoral fiscal manipulation might entail some groups being targeted at the expense of others, or all voter groups being targeted at the expense of office rents that politicians value. Because of the difficulty of analytically finding an equilibrium, in section 6 we present an example which illustrates the political equilibrium. Conclusions are presented in section 7.
An Overview
To help readers better understand the detailed model in section 3, we first present an outline of our basic argument. We exposit the model in terms of geographically-targeted expenditure, which is important in many political systems, but stress that our argument applies equally well to spending that can be targeted at groups defined along dimensions other than the geographical. Hence, our analysis is relevant not only to majoritarian systems with geographically defined districts, but also to other types of electoral systems, such as proportional systems, in which parties may target different types of voters. (This is consistent with our broad definition of "pork barrel spending" set out in the introduction.) Furthermore, though policy is made by a single policymaker, as in a stylized presidential system, the basic argument is applicable to parliamentary systems in which policy is the result of bargaining within a legislature. In such models, bargaining strength in the legislature depends on vote shares, but the nature of legislative interactions means that policy outcomes may depend in complicated ways on the vote share that a party receives. Sophisticated voters with policy preferences may thus find it optimal to vote strategically rather than sincerely in a multi-candidate election, as in the models of Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) or Baron and Diermeier (2001) . However, since parties attract votes on the basis of the policy preferences voters perceive that they have, the key voter inference problem in our model should be crucial in parliamentary systems as well. In short, though we exposit our model in a way consistent with a specific set of electoral and legislative rules, we believe that the analysis is applicable to a far broader set of political institutions.
We assume that there is an election between an incumbent and a challenger at the end of every other period ("year") t, t + 2, etc. The incumbent has the ability to choose fiscal policy, where, for simplicity, we focus on the targeting of expenditures, and simply assume (in line with voters being fiscal conservatives) that incumbents can neither raise taxes, nor incur deficits. Hence, the sum of all expenditures must always equal the fixed level of taxes.
There are two regions, h = 1, 2, where voters in each region value a public good g h t supplied to their region. Since taxes are assumed fixed, we abstract here from other types of consumption which could be affected by tax policy. The utility of individual j in region h also depends on the distance between his most desired position π j over other policies (which is immutable and termed "ideology") and the position π P of the politician P in power.
Within each region h, there is a non-degenerate distribution of ideological preferences, which may change between elections. We denote the density function of voters in region h in the current election cycle as f h (π), where we suppress the time subscript. We consider both the case where the f h (π) are known to both voters and politicians, as well as the case of asymmetric information where the incumbent knows the densities f h (π), while voters only have imperfect information about them. The nature of the cycle is affected by the information specification, but in both cases a rational political cycle exists. For simplicity, we assume that the preference distribution is uncorrelated over elections, so that past electoral policy gives voters no information about the current distribution.
There are two parties L and R, with known ideological positions π L < π R , where we take π L and π R as given and assume no competition over ideology. Without loss of generality, we assume that party L is the incumbent.
The single-period utility of a voter in region h with ideological preferences π j if policymaker
where g h s (A) is public good provided by policymaker A to region h in period s. Voters care about the present discounted value of utility, and hence, about expected future values of g h s .
(Since g h s (A) does not depend on j, we ignore the index j in discussing the central problem of inferring g h t+1 from g h t .) Politicians, as actual or potential leaders of both regions, give weight to the utility from government spending of voters of each region. 8 This may be represented by a weight ω h P,s that politician P puts on utility from public goods of residents of that region, that is, on ln g h t .
(Since ideological preferences π j of both voters and politician's are fixed, putting the weight ω h P,s on a voter's total utility (1) would not qualitatively change the basic results.) A politician P 's single-period utility in period s if the policy in place is π A may be written
where g s is the vector ¡ g 1 s , g 2 s ¢ and
In contrast to the politician's ideological preferences π P which are known, the weights ω h P,s are unknown to voters. 9 The key inference problem giving rise to the possible effectiveness of electionyear spending in influencing rational voters may now be stated. The voter's problem is to infer the unobserved weight ω h P,t from the politician's observable choice of g h t . If ω h P,t has some persistence over 8 The difference between the objective functions of politicians and voters consistent with the "citizen-candidate" approach of Besley and Coate (1997) or Osborne and Slivinski (1996) . A key message of that approach is that because candidates have preferences just like citizens, they can be expected to act on those preferences once elected, rather than be bound by campaign "promises". This view is in fact central to our approach, where a voter's key inference problem is in discerning what those preferences are. We diverge from the basic citizen-candidate model in assuming that a citizen who is elected to make policy for an area wider than his or her own district will no longer act on the same (narrower) preferences he or she did when being a simply a member of (or representing) that district. We would argue that this assumption is quite reasonable. We do not model this "transformation" of preferences.
9 Bonomo and Terra (2005) consider politicians who have preferences over sectors, but where these preferences are known.
time, then pre-electoral g h t may contain information not only about ω h P,t , but also about ω h P,t+1 and hence g h t+1 , inducing forward-looking voters to respond to pre-electoral fiscal policy. 10 Why would voters not know a politician's preferences? (See footnote 8 on why these preferences are not identical to those of a citizen from the politician's region.) That is, there really an inference problem? We would argue that since the real world is multidimensional, a voter is necessarily uncertain about how much the politician will favor him relative to other priorities. Moreover, because the politician's environment changes over time, these preferences may change over time, but at the same time will display some persistence.
Another key question is why voters look at fiscal policy only right before the elections, in order to try to infer a politician's preferences, rather than at policy earlier in the incumbent's term. As in most of the literature, we assume that unobserved preferences (here ω h P,t ) are evolving over time in such a way that the most recent policy observation is the more informative about future policy than earlier observations. 11 We believe this partly captures the evolution of a politician's preferences, which may change over time (albeit slowly), justifying voters' concentration on recent policy to infer these preferences. The media follow policy more as elections get closer, reflecting greater voter interest in policy developments closer to elections. This suggests perhaps that voters believe that they have more to learn closer to elections, but may also be a reason why voters are more responsive to pre-election policy.
We now turn to the details. We start by looking at the problem of an incumbent politician, given the fiscal framework, then move to the voters's problem, and finally put the pieces together to find the equilibrium.
A Model of Politicians Who Have Preferences over Voters

The Incumbent's Problem
Politicians differ in the unobserved weight ω h P,s they put on voters of the two regions (or groups) in their objective function (2), as summarized by (3). For simplicity, we assume that ω h P,s is drawn from an i.i.d. distribution at the beginning of every election year for two years and that ω 2 P,s = 1−ω 1 P,s . (That is, ω h P,t+1 = ω h P,t if t is an election year, but ω h P,t and ω h P,t+2 are uncorrelated.) No correlation in ω h P,s across electoral cycles greatly simplifies the voters's inference problem, since observed policy in previous elections provides no information about current ω h P,s . 12 The distribution of ω h P,t , which is the same for both incumbent and challenger, is defined over ¡ ω l , ω u ¢ , where 0 ≤ ω l < ω u ≤ 1 and has a mean of ω.
The off-year decision
A politician L who was elected in t has an objective function Ω IN t+1 in the following non-election year t+1 (when he is in office and not facing an election in t+1) for the vector of public goods expenditure
where β is the discount factor and
¢ is L's expectation as of period t + 1 of the present discounted value of utility from t + 2 (an election year) onward. (Since the actual policy π A = π P , (2) and (3) yield current-period utility of P h ω h P,s ln g h s in an off-election year.) The assumptions that the government's budget is balanced each period and that ω h L as of t has a two-period life imply that actions at t + 1 have no effect on Ω E t+2 . The incumbent's off-year problem is simply to choose the g h t+1 to maximize P 2 h=1 ω h P,t+1 ln g h t+1 subject to his budget constraint. Total expenditures equal total tax revenues, which are assumed fixed and set equal to unity. (All politicians are thus identical in terms of total spending.) The choice of fiscal policy is the choice of composition of the government budget, which comprises expenditures that can be targeted to specific groups of voters, and other types of expenditure. For simplicity, in this section, we assume that there are no expenditures other than public goods g 1 and g 2 . (In section 5 we consider the implications of politicians also spending on goods that they alone value, that is, "office rents".) Therefore, each period, the government faces the budget constraint:
The first-order condition for the politician's off-election year problem is:
12 Assuming ω h P,s follows an MA(1) process with innovations that are revealed to voters with a one-period lag has these implications. This alternative type of assumption is, for instance, the one used in Rogoff (1990) . A political budget cycle would also arise with an MA(1) process with innovations that are never revealed to voters, as long as imperfect persistence of ω h P,s makes g h t−1 a more relevant signal to voters than expenses observed further into the past. However, this assumption makes the analysis of the problem far more complicated.
where, for ease of exposition, we drop the time subscript on ω h L,s , that is, we write ω h
so that voters's expected utility from reelecting the incumbent is increasing in ω h L .
The value of reelection
The value to L of reelection in t depends on the difference between his expected value of being in
, and his expected value of being out of office,
s expectation as of period t and the values of Ω t+1 are the present discounted values from t + 1
where β is the discount factor and E t Π t+3 is the expected gain from the possibility of reelection at t + 2 and later due to election at t. The first term in (8) is the gain to the incumbent in periods t + 1 and t + 2 of having policy reflect his preferred ideology rather than that of his opponent.
The second term is the value to the incumbent of having his preferred fiscal policy in period t + 1 rather than that of his opponent. The assumption that ω h L has a two-period life implies that as of t the incumbent faces an expected difference with respect to the challenger's preferences over voters only at t + 1 (where the difference is uncertain since L does not know his opponent's ω h R , and hence does not know what g R t+1 will be if R is elected). As of t the incumbent's expected preferences for dates t + 2 and later are identical to those of a representative candidate. The assumption that the government's budget is balanced each period further implies that actions at t + 1 have no effect on the incumbent's expected utility at t + 2 and later.
The last term reflects the effect of reelection at t on the probability of reelection at the end of t + 2 and later. For example, if the probability of reelection at t + 2 is independent of the election outcome at t, then E t Π t+3 = 0. Conversely, if a party's reelection at t increases the probability of its reelection at t + 2 and later, then E t Π t+3 > 0, where the value of the higher probability of reelection at t+2 and later stems (in the absence of "office rents") solely from the ability to enact one's preferred ideological policies. 13 The larger the positive effect of electoral victory at t on the probability of later election (where this effect could be negative), the larger is E t Π t+3 . Rents would add an important component to the value of reelection at t and all future dates, as in section 5 below.
To summarize, the value of reelection depends on the implied possibility of reelection further into the future, the value of policy reflecting one's own rather than the opponent's preferences, and the value of rents. In all relevant cases, however, the expected value
¢ will be strictly positive. 14
The election year
The incumbent's objective Ω ELE t in the previous election year t can be written
where ρ, the incumbent's perceived probability of reelection, is a function of the fraction of votes N L t the left-wing incumbent receives, and where Ω IN t+1 and Ω OUT t+1 are as defined above. Equation (9) may be written
Since E L t Ω OUT t+1 , the expected utility if not reelected, is independent of any choices the incumbent makes, (10) makes clear that the choice of policy in an election year depends on the effect of a choice of g L t on the politician's current utility (as it would in an off-election year) versus the effect on the
as discussed above.
For tractability, we assume that the probability ρ(N L ) that the incumbent assigns to winning is a continuous increasing function in N L (justified, for example, by assuming that the incumbent doesn't know how many votes he needs to win, or how many potential voters will show up to vote). The 13 To take a simple example, if L's re-election at t increases its expected probability of re-election at t + 2 (and hence its probability of being in office at t + 3 and t + 4) from ρ L toρ L > ρ L , but has no effect on later proababilities, we would have E
Under some circumstances (for instance, if being elected today reduces the probability of future re-election), this expected value may be negative. In those cases, the incumbent would simply not run for re-election. We only model a situation where the incumbent has already decided to run. key point is that the incumbent maximizes this probability by maximizing the number of votes he receives. Assuming that ρ 0 is nonzero only for some ranges of N L would complicate the mathematics without changing the basic qualitative results. 15 The fraction of votes N L received by the incumbent is given by (where we have assumed both regions have a unit mass of voters):
where
is the fraction of region h's votes that goes to the incumbent, and where the voter's inference problem yields the dependence of vote shares on current expenditure policy g h t .
We derive
¢ , is independent of the choice of g h t , so that the incumbent treats it as given in his period t choice of fiscal policy. For the election year, the incumbent's optimal choice is given by maximizing (10) subject to the budget constraint (5), given the t + 1 decision (7). The first-order condition at t (remember φ h (g h t ) is the share of region h's votes that goes to the incumbent) is:
The left-hand side of (11) represents the benefit from a marginal increase in g 1 t . As in the postelection year, this benefit includes the utility gain this change induces for voters in region 1, the first term on the left-hand side. However, prior to an election the politician potentially derives an additional benefit from targeting region 1 voters, namely obtaining more votes from them. The right-hand side represents the same benefit from a marginal increase in g 2 t . We may express the relation between g h t and ω h L more compactly as follows. Use 1 − ω 1 L = ω 2 L to write (11) for choice of g 1 t as
15 A related analysis with discrete ρ(N L ) can be found in Drazen and Eslava (2005) . An alternative in a multi-region model are "winner-take-all" electoral rules, similar to Strömberg (2005) , in which the candidate with a majority of the votes wins the region, and the candidate with the majority of regions wins the election. ρ (·) would then be the probability of winning a majority of regions as a function of the vector of public goods spending targeted to each region.
for goods g 1 t and g 2 t , where A
is the vote gain to the incumbent from transferring a dollar of public goods expenditure from region 2 to region 1. (Using g 1 t + g 2 t = 1, this could be expressed as a function solely of one of the g h t .) This vote gain from a change in expenditure composition is known to the incumbent politician, but needn't be known to the voters.
Since the only difference between an election year and a non-election year is the election itself, a political budget cycle appears if g h t 6 = g h t+1 . The result in (13) thus implies that there will be a political budget cycle as long as φ
. We now turn to the inference and voting problem of voters to find out when is this the case.
Voter Decisions Based on Fiscal Policy
An individual's only choice variable is how to vote in an election year. Consider a representative election year t, where the voter's choice depends on his expectation of utility in years t + 1 and later.
Our assumption that ω h P,s has a two-period life starting in the election year means that in an election year voters need look forward only one period. The voter may then consider each election cycle independently. Consider the election cycle t and t + 1. A forward-looking voter j in region h prefers the incumbent L over the challenger R if
Note that, given (5), observing the g t the other region receives provides no additional information on ω h L . (Since we are concentrating on a single election cycle, for simplicity of exposition, we drop the time-subscript on the ω h P,t ³ = ω h P,t+1´) . Condition (14) determines the relation between pre-electoral fiscal policy g h t and the incumbent's vote share (and hence reelection probability). The key issue for voter inference is the information provided by election-year fiscal policy about post-electoral utility. When voters know value of ω h L ex ante, targeted expenditure cannot affect voting patterns. When voters do not have this information, the extent of their knowledge about the distribution of ω h L will determine the extent to which the incumbent is able to affect the share of votes he receives in equilibrium. In addition, the incumbent has the incentive to target more "swing" regions (more precisely, regions with high values of φ 0 h (·) evaluated at g h t+1 , as discussed in section 4.1 below). Voters are aware of this incentive. Hence, targeting will be less effective in attracting votes (in the sense that voters from a smaller range of ideological positions in region h end up voting for the incumbent) if voters know their region is highly likely to be electorally targeted. In short, politicians may have more information than voters about the electoral importance of different regions (and of course about their own preferences), and the extent of the information asymmetry affects the ability of the incumbent to obtain political benefits from targeted expenditures.
We consider three cases: full information; asymmetric information with a fully revealing fiscal policy; asymmetric information where g h t doesn't reveal the politician's preferences over regions.
Full information
depends only on the known ω h P and is independent of g h t . Logarithmic utility implies g h t+1 (L) = ω h L , so that a voter who knows the ω h P is indifferent between two candidates if his preferred ideological position is
Any voter j in region h with π j >π h F I will vote for the challenger, and any voter with π j <π h F I will vote for the incumbent. Note that in this caseπ h F I is independent of fiscal policy, so that voting decisions cannot be affected by pre-election fiscal policy. There will thus be no targeting of voters through fiscal policy.
Asymmetric Information
When ω h L is not known, voters must use g h t (L) to obtain information on ω h L . Using (14), where (unlike the previous case) the expectation
¤ depends on g h t , the ideological position of the indifferent voter, e π h , becomes
where μ ≡ E t ln g h t+1 (R), the expected utility under the challenger. (Since the challenger has no way to signal, μ simply depends on the prior). Within region h, all individuals with π j < e π h (g h t ) vote for the incumbent L party, while those with π j > e π h (g h t ) vote for the R party. The dependence of the position of the indifferent voter on g h t follows from the effect of observing g h t on the utility voters expect to receive if the incumbent is reelected.
We can then express the fraction of region h voters who vote for the incumbent as a function of the pre-election expenditure observed by voters. Denoting this fraction as φ h (g h t ) and denoting the lower bound of π j by π, we obtain:
where F h (·) is the cumulative distribution associated with the density f h (·). Vote shares φ h (·) depend on g h t because the indifferent voter's expectation of post-electoral utility is conditional on observed g h t . That is, since the politician's choice of g h t is used to form expectations of ω h and ln g h t+1 from (13), the equilibrium expectation of period t + 1 utility will depend on the politician's choice of g h t . Differentiating (17) with respect to g h t , one obtains
where we have used equations (16) and (17). Note that regions differ in the level of public goods that they receive, and, partly as a result of this, in the ideological position of the indifferent voter in region h, e π h (g h t ). We assume that the f h (·) have no mass points, so that a marginal increase in e π h (g h t ) cannot induce a discontinuous jump in the number of voters supporting the incumbent.
Revealing versus non-revealing fiscal policy under asymmetric information
There are two asymmetric information cases to consider -one where voters can perfectly infer ω L from the g h t (L), the other where they cannot. The first case corresponds to voters knowing the densities f h (π), with the only asymmetric information being about ω. In this case, the relation between g h t and ω h L given in (13) allows voters to infer ω h L from g h t since f h (π) is known. 16 That is, knowing the region's ideological distribution and having observed the incumbent's spending choices, voters can calculate ω 1 L from (13a). The second case corresponds to voters not knowing the densities f h (π). (13)). Hence, the incumbent gets the same number of votes from each region as in the full information case. However, vote shares do respond to g h t since a change in g h t reveals a change in ω h L (whereas under full information the same change in ω h L is known directly) and hence induces a change in e π h . In the fully revealing case we thus get a separating equilibrium with political manipulation analogous to that in Rogoff (1990) , where it is election year changes in fiscal policy that allow separation. Hence, as we show in section 4.1, even if the ω L can be perfectly inferred, a political cycle may still exist.
If voters can fully infer the value of the
Alternatively (and more realistically), voters may have less information than do politicians about how effective spending targeted to a region is in terms of gaining votes. We incorporate this possibility by assuming that voters are uncertain about the exact distribution of ideological positions in each region (that is, the f h (π)). In this asymmetric information equilibrium, voters cannot fully infer
There is then an "extra" mechanism for electoral manipulation, since voters cannot infer to what extent they are targeted for electoral purposes, or because the incumbent has a genuine preference for their region even in the absence of elections.
That is, voters in the two regions who receive the same level of public goods will be unable to infer with certainty that this is not a reflection that they are equally liked.
In both cases φ 0 h (g h t ) measures the electoral benefit to the politician from targeting an additional dollar of public goods to voters in region. As can be seen from (18b), the size of this benefit depends first on how much that additional dollar expands the range of ideological positions for which voters prefer the incumbent, characterized by the position of the indifferent voter e π h (g h t ). If the utility that voters expect under the incumbent in t + 1 increases, e π h (g h t ) increases (that is, moves to the right) and the range of supporters for the incumbent expands. For a given change in expected utility, the increase of e π h (g h t ) is smaller the farther apart π R and π L are, as the cost to voters from having their least preferred ideological position in power becomes larger. Second, φ 0 h (g h t ) depends on the mass of h voters at point e π h (g h t ), namely f h ³ e π h (g h t )´,which determines how many additional votes the incumbent obtains from increasing e π h (g h t ). 17
Political-Economic Equilibrium
To close the model and derive the political-economic equilibrium under rational expectations, we now relate incumbent's optimal behavior in choosing g h t as a function of φ
as summarized in (13) with optimal voter behavior yielding the φ
for the g h t received as summarized in (18b). (As shown above, under full information, e π h and therefore φ h are independent of g h t , so that φ
Equations (6) and (13) therefore imply there is no political cycle in this case.)
The first important result is that if vote shares can be affected by targeted spending on public goods (that is, in the asymmetric information case), such spending increases the share of votes that goes to the incumbent, despite the fact that voters recognize the electoral incentives faced by the incumbent.
Proposition 1 In a political equilibrium under asymmetric information, φ
Proof: See Appendix
Under asymmetric information there are two cases to consider: the first where fiscal policy fully reveals the politicians preferences, the second where it does not. We consider them in turn.
Political Cycles in a Fully Revealing Equilibrium
Even if voters know the densities f h (π) for all regions and can therefore perfectly infer the incumbent's ω h L , there is a political cycle:
Proposition 2 In a fully revealing political equilibrium, there is a political cycle in that g h t 6 = g h t+1 for each h.
Proof: See Appendix
We will characterize which region gets targeted (that is, who receives more spending than in the off-election year) in terms of which region is more swing than the other. It is important to emphasize that we define being "swing" in a very precise sense: region 1 is considered the "swing"
. That is, a region is more swing than the other if, at the point where both regions receive their off-election expenditure allocations, spending an extra dollar in region 1 earns the incumbent more votes than spending it in region 2. This definition captures the notion that a swing group is one where votes are especially responsive to targeting.
, then (13) together with decreasing marginal utility of g h t (and the lack of mass points in the f h distributions) imply that g 1 t > g 1 t+1 and g 2 t < g 2 t+1 . The more swing region will thus receive g h t > g h t+1 , while the other region receives g h t < g h t+1 . In other words, even though voters can identify which is the region with a higher concentration of "swing voters" (higher φ
, that region will still be targeted. Florida will be targeted even if they know they are "Florida".
Though it may seem surprising that voters in the more swing region will respond to pre-electoral targeting even when they know they are targeted for electoral purposes, it is not hard to see why this must be true. Suppose, for example, that φ
, and that this is known to voters because they know the f h (π (·)) distribution for each group. Recognizing the incentives faced by the incumbent, if voters in region 1 observed g 1 t = g 2 t , they would infer that the incumbent puts a lower weight on their utility than on voters in region 2 because, despite being more attractive electorally, they receive the same spending. If Floridians knew they were swing and nonetheless were not targeted by the incumbent, they could only conclude that he places a low value on their utility (lower than he actually does) and would thus vote against him. Conversely, in order to believe that both regions are equally liked, voters would need to see more spending in group 1. Swing voters are thus indeed responsive to fiscal targeting, despite recognizing the incumbent's electoral incentives and knowing they are an attractive electoral front.
Characterizing who gets targeted under asymmetric information in terms of the voter densities
), rather than in terms of φ
as we did above, is much harder. To see why, note that two factors determine a region's electoral value as captured by φ 0 h in (18a): the density f h (·) of voters along the ideological space and, given f h (·), the effect of g h t on expected utility in t + 1. A region can be more electorally valuable (that is, more "swing" as defined above) even if it has lower
if g h t is particularly effective in raising voters's expected utility. That is, if one considers the density of voters at the non-electorally-motivated (that is, t + 1) level of expenditures, it is clear
∂g h t will in general vary with g h t . In particular, one could have that φ
) in cases where g 2 t+1 were sufficiently less than g 1 t+1 . For instance, a region that in a non-election period receives a particularly low level of public goods is attractive for electoral targeting since, given concavity of utility function, the impact on its expected utility from a small increase in perceived ω is very high. It is also the case that the function
itself may vary across regions, as it depends on the information voters have about f h (π h )). This difficulty for characterizing how swing a region is in terms of its f h (π h )) distribution also holds in the non-fully revealing case, to which now we move.
Non-Fully Revealing Political Equilibrium
Alternatively, voters in group h are unable to infer the ω h from the g h t because they lack information about the f h (π), implying that they cannot perfectly infer how many votes the incumbent gets for targeting their group, φ
. To define an equilibrium, let us define
which is a voter's expected period t + 1 utility from g as a function of observed g h t under asymmetric information if incumbent L is reelected, given his information about f h (π) and ω. Using (13a) and
and a similar equation for region 2. Note that (18b) implies
In this case we have dropped the superscript h from e π h (g h t ) because voters in each region do not know ex-ante how they differ from those of the other region. As a result, the functions e π(g h t ) and Ψ ¡ g h t ¢ are identical for both groups (though the levels g h t at which they are evaluated will in general differ across regions). By substituting φ (for h = 1, 2) such that: 1) voters are choosing how to vote optimally according to (14) given their beliefs; 2) the incumbent chooses g 1 t and g 2 t optimally according to (13) given voters's beliefs; and 3) voters's beliefs are rational and based on the politician's behavior and the known distributions of π and ω (so that the incumbent's policy choice of g h t ratifies voters's beliefs, that is,
Characteristics of A Non-Revealing Political Equilibrium
Because (22) is a nonlinear differential equation in the function Ψ (·), we cannot solve it analytically. (We provide a numerical solution in section 6 below for the case including rents to holding office). We can however derive some characteristics of equilibrium.
As shown in Proposition 1, under asymmetric information φ
is strictly positive. It follows from (11) that the more electorally valuable region will be targeted in the election year in the general asymmetric information case, as was the case in a fully revealing equilibrium. That is,
Proposition 3
The region with the higher value of φ 0 h (·) evaluated at the post-electoral g h t+1 receives higher targeted expenditures in an election period t relative to the subsequent non-election period t+1, while the other region receives lower targeted expenditures in t relative to t + 1.
Proof: See Appendix
Intuitively, if one region is more electorally valuable when its voting behavior is evaluated at the non-electorally motivated level of public goods provided, then in an election period fiscal policy will be targeted to get its votes.
Note that an important difference between this scenario and the fully revealing case is that here the shares of votes received by each candidate may differ from what results under full information.
The reason is that voters cannot perfectly infer the ω h t from observed spending and, as a result, the ideological position of the indifferent voter will in general differ from that in the full information case. Moreover, this limited inference ability of voters gives the incumbent extra "space" for political manipulation in the following precise sense: a smaller fraction of the ideological spectrum of a swing region will be captured by the incumbent in the fully-revealing equilibrium than in the non-revealing case. In other words, if swing voters knew they were swing, they would be able to correctly interpret high pre-election spending on them as partly reflecting their electoral attractive rather then them being genuinely liked by the incumbent. Conversely, in the less important non-swing region the incumbent will convince more ideological positions to vote for him in the fully-revealing case than under asymmetric information about the f h . 18 18 To see that this is the case with a simple example, suppose that in the non-revealing case voters assign a probability In order to highlight the effect of targeted expenditures on voting, it was assumed in the model that there is no competition over ideology in an election. However, ideology affects the size of targeted expenditure in an election period. Greater ideological differences between the two candidates have a number of effects on the use of targeted expenditure policy, which may be summarized by (21), reproduced here:
onsider a mean-preserving increase in the difference between π R and π L . Given the voter density
, the larger is the ideological spread between the two parties, that is, the greater is π R − π L , the smaller will be the effect of targeted expenditures on votes. The reason is that the greater is π R − π L , the smaller is the effect of targeted expenditure on e π h (g h t ), since the larger is the cost of voters of not having actual policy be their preferred option between π R and π L . Put another way, the greater is the difference between the two parties' ideological positions, the more voting is influenced by ideology and the less by targeted expenditure. This "first-order" effect is as one would expect intuitively. Conversely, in close ideological elections, targeted expenditures would play a large role.
However, since a change in π R − π L affects the position of the indifferent voter e π h (g h t ) in (16), there will in general be effects on φ
. As above, the net effect will depend on the distribution of ideology.
Rents to Holding Office
We now add a value of holding office (over and above the value to the politician of enacting his own preferred ideology), which we call "rents" . Specifically, a part of government expenditure may be spent on a good K that is valued only by the politician ("desks"). The key effect of this change is the possibility that targeted public goods expenditures to all regions rise in an election year, at the
takes a given high value H, and a probability (1 − p) that it takes a low value L (H > L) . Suppose also that φ in the asymmetric case relate to one another according to
expense of K. This result does not depend on voters assigning no value to K, only that there are some types of expenditure that voters as a whole value less than others, and these may be cut in an election year. The characterization of K as total waste in the eyes of voters is simply an extreme way to capture those differences in the value assigned by voters to different goods and services provided by the government.
The government's budget constraint now becomes
The voter's problem is as described in section 3.2, except that here we assume, for simplicity, that voters in each region observe only their own g h t , but not that of the other region. The politician's objective function is obviously different than in section 3.1. The incumbent L's objective in a nonelection year t + 1 parallels (4) but with the addition of rents:
where rents χ are an increasing, weakly concave function of K. 19 The incumbent's objective in the election year t can then be written
The difference
but where the value in E t Π t+3 to being in office after t + 2 includes the expected present discounted value of future office rents in addition to ideology. Equation (27) represents four components in this model which make reelection valuable, three of which were present in (8): the ability to implement one's preferred ideology; the ability to target expenditures to preferred regions; the rents from office;
and the possibility that reelection at t gives to win future reelection and hence gain future advantage of being in office.
With rents from holding office, the first-order condition in a non-election year for each region h (found by maximizing (25) subject to (24)) equates the marginal value of targeted expenditures to the marginal value of rents (where once again we consider g h t and K t over a single election cycle, so we suppress the time subscripts on ω h L, t ):
These first-order conditions for the two regions yield (6). Similarly, for an election year, one derives a first-order condition equating the value of targeted expenditures to the value of office rents:
for h = 1, 2.
The left hand side of (29) represents the benefit from a marginal increase in g h t . As in the post-election period, this benefit includes the utility gain this change induces for region h's voters.
However, prior to an election the politician potentially derives an additional benefit from targeting region h, namely obtaining more votes from this region's voters.
Since (29) holds for both regions, optimal choices of g 1 t and g 2 t therefore also satisfy:
With respect to the post-electoral allocation of expenditures there is a pre-electoral shift of government resources away from "desks" and into targeted spending. In other words, K t < K t+1 . To see that this is the case, combine φ
> 0 with the fact that K t+1 satisfies the post-election first-order condition (28). Given these two elements, if the incumbent were to choose K t = K t+1 , the pre-election marginal benefit of targeted public goods spending would exceed that of desks. Since χ(K) is (weakly) concave, satisfying the pre-election first-order condition (29) requires lower nontargeted expenditure before the election. The pre-electoral shift of resources toward targeted spending holds for any realization of ω 1 L and ω 2 L , so that all types of politicians have incentives to change the composition of expenditures prior to an election.
How do electoral motives change the allocation of resources across regions in the pre-election period, compared to non-election periods? That is, how do g 1 t and g 2 t compare to g 1 t+1 and g 2 t+1 ? We provide here an intuitive discussion of how these resources are allocated.
In t + 1 there is no electoral motive for targeted public goods spending, so g 1 t+1 and g 2 t+1 serve as the reference point in measuring electoral effects. Without loss of generality, suppose that voters in region 1 are more electorally valuable, that is, φ
satisfy the first-order condition (28), and φ 0 h (g) > 0, the following relations hold:
¢¤
That is, if the t+1 composition of spending was imposed in t, the marginal benefit of expenditures targeted to any region would exceed that of K, and the benefit of spending one more dollar on public goods for region 1 exceeds that of spending it on region 2. Given the concavity of χ(K), the incumbent then has the incentive to transfer resources from non-targeted expenditures K to g 1 , the most valuable form of targeted spending. What happens to g 2 t and the final effect on K t depend on the relative distance between φ
¢ .
There are two cases to consider. If φ
¢ are similar in value, then both g 1 t and g 2 t will be higher than the corresponding g 1 t+1 and g 2 t+1 , since a small increase in g 1 t will suffice to make the marginal benefit of transferring resources to region 2 equal to that of transferring resources to region 1. The equilibrium composition of spending before the election would involve lower K t and higher targeted spending to both regions compared to the post-election period. Alternatively, if the
are not close to one another, then it may be the case that while g 1 t > g 1 t+1 unambiguously, targeted spending on region 2 will fall, that is, g 2 t < g 2 t+1 . That is, rather than reducing desks to finance all electoral spending on region 1, the politician takes expenditures away from region 2.
An Example
Because of the involved nature of an analytical solution for
, further characterizing equilibrium outcomes in general is difficult. We therefore present a specific illustrative example, which may also help the reader's intuition. .
Calculating an Equilibrium
We make the following specific assumption about functional forms. Let χ (K) = θK, where θ is a
¢ =Ω, a constant since a politician's expectation of his future utility depends on his current choice of g h t only through its effect on election probabilities. For simplicity in this illustration, we assume that π R (= −π L ) = 0.25. For tractability. let ρ(N L ) be a linear function of the formρN L , so thatρ is the marginal effect of one more vote on the probability of winning. We
. This distribution has the nice feature of being concentrated and symmetric around zero (the midpoint between π I and π C ), and will prove tractable. Here,
respectively, the upper and lower bound for π in region h.
We assume that both voters and incumbent know one of the two regions is characterized by α h = α and the other by α h = α (equivalently, _ π h takes one value for one of the regions and another for the other region). However, only politicians know which region has each value of α, while voters simply assign some probability p α h that region h is the one with α: Pr(α h = α) = p α h . From the first-order conditions (28) and (29) the incumbent's optimal choices for g h t+1 and g h t are given by:
and
where Λ = βρΩ is the value of one additional vote to the incumbent.
In order to find a solution for φ
¢ consistent with voters forming expectations rationally, we first rewrite the incumbent's first-order condition (32) to note explicitly its dependence on individuals's expectations. Using equation (18a) and our assumptions about f h , π L , and π R , note that
¢ can be written as:
affected by voters's expectations, our analysis of their beliefs will focus on Y (g h t ). Also, the incumbent and challenger are identical ex-ante, so ω h R is characterized by the same unconditional distribution that characterizes ω h L . E ¡ ln ω h R ¢ is formed according to that unconditional distribution.
Voters infer the relationship between ω h L and g h t from the first-order condition (32), and use it to form expectations about the future. That relationship is given by
It is clear from this expression that information about α h (the electoral attractiveness of a region)
influences how voters respond to pre-electoral manipulation. If a h were known to voters, they could perfectly infer ω h L from their observation of g h t . This would correspond to what we call above a "perfectly revealing equilibrium".
by taking logs on both sides of (35), and using Pr(α h =ᾱ) = pᾱ h .
Writing these expectations in terms of Y (g h t ), we obtain: . We now proceed to the illustration of those outcomes.
Illustration
To illustrate the effect of electoral cycles on fiscal choices, we obtain a function Y (g h t ) that solves the differential equation (36), and then find the incumbent's optimal choice of g h t given ω L and that function Y (g h t ). For expenditure levels aboveḡ we use numerical methods to find a solution to (36). The procedure we use to solve (36) is further explained in the appendix.
Suppose that for both L and R, ω h follows a uniform distribution with values between ω l = 0.2 and ω u = 0.8. In terms of other parameters, the specific solution we depict is based on θ = 1.3, 20 The fact that E ln ω 
Conclusions
We present a model of a political budget cycle in which politicians use public goods expenditures targeted to more politically "useful" voters at the expense of other voters (or other categories of expenditures). Hence, electoral manipulation is present, but does not show up in aggregate expenditures or deficits in the government budget, consistent with recent empirical findings about established democracies. Election-year provision of pork-barrel spending "works" even though forward-looking rational voters correctly solve the inference problem of trying to discern the motivation for electionyear spending under imperfect information. That is, election-year economics succeeds in gaining the votes of rational voters, even though they know there is some probability that they are being targeted solely to get their votes. Even in the extreme case where voters know just how "swing" they are, an electoral cycle in pork barrel spending will in general be present. 22 The extent to which pre-and post-electoral policy differ (i.e. the size of the political budget cycle) obviously depends on the specific parameters chosen. For instance, larger values of Λ imply a larger value of re-election, and therefore lead the incumbent to chose larger g h t . Small values of θ imply that the post-election level of targeted expenditure is already high (for any candidate) and, given decreasing marginal utility, reduce the potential differences between one and another candidate in terms of provision of targeted goods. This reduces the incentives for electoral increases of g h t . For large enough θ, one of the two groups receives less spending before than after the election. Larger ideological gaps between the different candidates reduce the importance voters give to fiscal policy in choosing the candidate, and therefore reduce the incentives for electoral increases of g h t . Different choices of α 1 and α 2 will change the electoral benefit the incumbent can obtain from increasing g h t , as can be deduced from the figures above. The general patterns of electoral changes for g h t , however, are quite robust to the parameters chosen.
A key innovation of the paper is to introduce asymmetric information about a variable other than competence in order to explain the why targeted spending is effective in attracting rational voters. The concern of voters about the preferences of the incumbent over different voting groups, rather than about his competence, is more than a semantic difference. In the competence approach, it is crucial that voters cannot observe not only the characteristics of the incumbent but also some component of the budget. In contrast, our approach implies that a political budget cycle may emerge even if voters fully observe all of the incumbent's fiscal policy choices. We therefore shift the focus from unobservability of key components of fiscal policy (which would not seem to characterize more developed democracies) to less than perfect observability of a politician's underlying policy preferences. As indicated, this shift in what characteristic of politician's is unobserved has significant implications for the type of political fiscal cycle consistent with voter rationality.
Our focus on politicians favoring some groups over others is motivated by traditional election-year economics, which gives a key role to special interests in electoral budget manipulation. Although the idea of pork barrel politics is common in political economy, it has not been incorporated in intertemporal models of fiscal policymaking. That is, models in which politicians choose targeted expenditure in order to gain political support generally assume that politicians can commit to whatever promises they make. In an electoral context, this approach leaves unanswered a key question, namely, why forward-looking voters who are targeted by a candidate before an election find it rational to vote for that candidate. Hence, the question of why pork barrel spending attracts voters requires a more fully articulated model than is found in previous literature. We think this paper makes progress in that direction. ≤ 0. The incumbent would then get more votes by reducing, or at least not increasing, targeted spending to group h. Larger g h t in this case cannot be driven by electoral motives, but by ω h L being high. Increases in g h t then lead voters in group h to perceive higher ω h L and thus to expect higher post-election utility. As a result, more group h voters want to vote for the incumbent, that is, φ . This implies that
. Therefore, letting e π h P R be the indifferent voter's position in this perfectly revealing equilibrium, we obtain:
From the definition of φ h (·) in (17) and this e π h P R (g h t ), it follows that φ h in this perfectly revealing equilibrium depends on g h t . Hence, from Proposition 1 we know φ 0 h (g h t ) > 0. Moreover,
Since in general the density of voters is not the same across groups (that is, f 1 (π 1 P R ) 6 = f 2 (π (13a) and (13b) then imply that g 1 t > g 1 t+1 and g 2 t < g 1 t+1 . ¤
B A solution to equation (36)
The g h t ≤ḡ branch of equation (36) 
We use expression (A2) and the definition ofḡ given after (36) (which implies Y (ḡ) = 1) to find:
and choose the value of c 0 that solves (A3) and ensures 0 ≤ḡ ≤ 1.
For the g h t ≥ḡ branch of equation (36) we find a numerical solution based on a finite-difference approximation to the equation. The specific solution we choose is the one that ensures Y (ḡ) = 1 and Y 0 (ḡ) = −e −E(ln ω h R ) θc 0 (where, given (A2), the latter amounts to φ 0 (g h t ) being smooth aroundḡ). We first denote Y i ≡ Y (g i ) (where i indexes the grid of g h t we use), and replace Y 0 (g h t ) with a finite difference approximation to it, namely,
. Then, re-write this branch of equation (36) as
− e E(ln ω h R ) = 0 , where Y 0 is as explained above. This can be seen as a system of N equations on Y i and Y i+1 for N different values of g t in the [ḡ, 1] interval. Since we know the value of Y 0 = Y (ḡ) andḡ, the system only has N unknowns, and we can solve for them. The solution is found using a quasiNewton method of Broyden (see, for example, Boyce and DiPrima, 1997) , where we use as initial guess Y (g h t ) = (0.99, 0.98, ..., 0). We also try two other alternatives methods to solve this branch of equation (36) , we obtain this value of Y 0 (g h t ) using an algorithm of Broyden (for this and the Runge-Kutta algorithms see, for instance, Boyce and DiPrima [1997] ). Our second alternative method finds an analytic solution to a first-order Taylor approximation to the g t > _ g branch of (36).
